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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper proposes modeling the economies of 
personal relationship so that its impact on the 
collective economic outcome in dyadic business 
exchanges can be measured. Firstly, this paper 
introduces personal relationship in business 
environment. Secondly, some of the parameters that 
are related to the issue of personal relationship are 
presented. Thirdly, a hybrid approach is proposed for 
developing a mathematical model; with the 
mathematical model, a better understanding of the 
impact of personal relationship on switching business 
exchange relationship and the costs involved 
(switching costs) can be understood and 
experimented with.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a dyadic business exchange environment, the 
relationship between two organizations is basically 
between two agents, and the relations can be a of a 
personal-relationship nature as the business 
relationship may grow to become personal one with 
time. On many occasions, in spite of the personal 
nature of the relationship, interacting agents are still 
able to coordinate their actions to bring economic 
benefits to their organizations.  
 
However, the fact that selfish behavior of an agent 
may put his or her personal interest before the 
organization’s benefit, demands the investigation of 
the loss of collective welfare due to selfish and 
uncoordinated behavior. Recent research efforts have 
focused on quantifying this loss for specific 
environments; the investigation of price anarchy has 
provided a number of measures by which is it 
possible to design social systems with robustness 
against selfish behaviors (Jensen, 2002; Namatame, 
2006).  
 
Structure of this paper: Section 2 presents some basic 
issues related to personal relationship in dyadic 
business exchanges. Section 3 seeks to identify the 
parameters involved in the personal relationships. 
Section 4 explores about the types of mathematics 
needed for building a mathematical model for 
personal relationship.   
 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN BUSINESS 
EXCHANGES 
 
Business relationships (or relational contracts 
(MacNeil, 1980)) develop between organizations 
described as collective units on inter-organizational 
level, are only for the economic benefits of the 
organizations involved. Personal relationship or 
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Figure 1: Personal relationships in business exchanges 
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loyalty between two agents from otherwise 
independent organizations, may compromise the 
respective organizations interests (Jensen, 2002). The 
problem of loyalty is especially sensitive in contexts 
where the individual agents hold high-trust-posts 
(Giddens, 1991). High-trust-posts involve tasks that 
are executed beyond the direct surveillance of the 
central leaderships of organizations. In this case, the 
personal relationship between the individual agents 
becomes the decisive factor of the business 
relationship between the respective organizations. 
Thus, personal relationship can hamper economic 
profits that can be derived from the business 
exchange between the organizations.  
 
The Time Factor 
 
Personal relationships, stand alone or part of business 
relationships, take time to develop; see figures 1 and 
2. When business relationships are to be developed 
quickly, the quality of personal interactions 
(relationships) may suffer due to stressful 
environment of relationship acceleration (Wilson, 
1995); this phenomenon is also known as “time-
compression diseconomies” (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989).      
 
Switching Cost 
 
Personal relationship can also bring a business 
relationship to a stalemate at which conclusive 
decisions has to be taken whether to continue or 
discontinue the business relationship.   The most 
important factor to be considered at this point is the 
cost of quitting (or switching cost) (Jensen, 2002).  
 
Switching a business exchange relationship based on 
individual social contracts is considerably lower than 
for inter-organizational long-term commitments, such 
as strategic alliances. Relation-specific investments 
are first of all to be found in human asset specificity 
of the agents linking the organizations. The highest 
switching cost of individual social contracts is most 
likely to be as social costs between the individual 
agents involved. On organization-level these inter-
personal costs are normally to be judged as low.  
Beside this qualitative analysis, however, there is no 
tool available to help an organization measure the 
switching cost of quitting a business exchange 
relationship that is dominated by personal 
relationship. Literature provides no mathematical 
models for this purpose; Lack of mathematical 
models for this purpose is mainly due to the adaptive 
nature of the economic agents and the uncertainties 
involved, and due to the complex nature of personal 
relationships involving huge number of parameters 
drawn from psychology, sociology, to management 
and economics. 
 
Guanxi 
  
Guanxi is a special case of personal relationships in 
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Figure-2: The time factor in establishing Personal Relationship (PR) 
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business environment. The importance of developing 
personal relationship (‘guanxi’ in Chinese) in order to 
conduct business in China is well documented (Li 
and Wright, 2000).  
 
We say guanxi is a special case because in the guanxi 
system, there must be personal relationship before the 
business relationship can foster.  However, in this 
paper, we focus on the personal relationship that 
develops because of the established (long-term) 
business relationship in an open market environment; 
see figure 2. As shown in figure 2, in the beginning, 
the relationship between two interacting agents is 
purely a business relationship; after long-term 
interactions, personal relationship can foster between 
the two agents, and if the personal relationship 
becomes the decisive factor in the business 
relationship, then we have a guanxi between the 
agents. In other words, with time, we move from 
open market system to guanxi system.  
 
A closely related issue is the organization-to- 
organization guanxi (or popularly known as the 
“keiretsu”, in Japanese language). In keiretsu, the 
“personal relationship” is not at the personal level, 
but at the organizational level (Miyashita and 
Russell, 1995).   
 
LITERATURE STUDY ON MODELING 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
Literature provides meticulous works on personal 
relationship in business exchanges, e.g. Chen 
(1994,1995), Davies, Leung, Luk and Wong (1995), 
Hwang (1987), Luo (1997) and Simmons and Munch 
(1996); see Lovett et al (1999) for a summary of the 
works. However, there is no serious work on 
mathematical modeling of the issue so that the 
switching costs can be calculated.  Literature study 
on mathematical modeling of personal relationship 
found a crude model (Lovett et al, 1999) that has 
severe limitations: the model is static, time-
insensitive, and uses a limited set of parameters.  
 
Model by Lovett et al (1999) 
 
This is a simple model for calculating the difference 
between collective value of business exchange under 
the guanxi system which is influenced by personal 
relationship, and under the open market system 
which is free from personal influences.  
   
An agent in personal relationship produces a fixed 
output in each period. The advantage of 
specialization in trade is that the output is more 
valuable if traded. The social surplus generated by 
individual i:  
Si = (untraded output) + (value of traded output)   
- (cost of production) - (cost of contracting)  
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where: Yi is the output of the agent, ti is the fraction 
of that agent's output that is traded, m is the constant, 
greater than one, by which output increases in value 
when traded, w is a constant marginal cost of 
production, and c is the constant marginal cost of 
contracting.  
 
Only two types of agents are considered in the model: 
New members (or juniors - J), and long-time 
members (or seniors - S). The total social surplus of 
the economy:  
 )1(           
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The guanxi system allows that juniors trade only a 
portion of their output; the seniors trade the whole 
output; in other words, 1 ,1 =< SJ tt . In the market 
system, all agents are allowed to trade all of their 
output immediately, meaning, 1 == SJ tt  
 
In addition, in the guanxi system, contracting costs 
are zero ( 0=c ), due to the trust between the 
interacting agents. In the market system, contracting 
costs are finite ( 0>c ).  
 
The cost of switching is the difference between SG 
(the social surplus generated in the guanxi economy) 
and SM (the social surplus generated in the market 
economy):  
)(    )1( wmYwtmtYS SJJJG −+−×+−=  
)(2 , cwmYS SJM −−=  
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TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF A 
MATHEMATICAL MODEL: 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARAMETERS 
 
Modeling the economics of personal relationship in 
dyadic business exchange is no easy task as huge 
number of parameters is involved and due to the 
complexities in modeling the interactions between 
the agents. The first step of the modeling process is 
the identification of the parameters involved.  The 
identification of parameters shown below is 
simplistic, but given as a starting point. 
 
The stochastic model, denoted by P, is an eight-tuple,  
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 ) , , , ,  , , ,( ΨtOCDEBGP cq=  
Where,  
G is the choice of governance form 
(contractual arrangements) of the business 
exchange (between buyers and sellers); there 
are mainly two governance norms:  
Gc - Governance by collective social 
norms (inter-organizational) 
Assumptions by Gc (on 
institutional/collective level): 
1. Mutual long-term commitment 
(solidarity) 
2. Flexibility (continuous mutual 
adjustment) 
3. Open information-sharing (mutual 
competence-development) 
 
Gi – Governance by individual social norms  
(inter-personal) 
Assumptions by Gi: 
1. Inter-personal commitment (loyalty) 
2. Flexibility 
3. Limited information sharing 
 
B is the behavioral assumptions of the 
agents; the agents (as institutions) will try to 
optimize their long-term benefits achieved 
through the exchange relationships, 
 
E is the business environment variables 
linked to the situational context such as the 
characteristics of the external environment 
and the characteristics of the task structure 
of the exchange dyad, 
 
D is the dimensions of the situational 
contexts, such as:  
1. Degree of complexity (produces static 
decision uncertainty of outcomes); 
2. Degree of dynamics/volatility or 
turbulence which produces dynamic 
decision uncertainty of outcomes; 
3. Values on risk (probability of loss or 
success)  
 
Cq is the switching costs, which consists of: 
 Cqb - loss of current benefits (direct and 
indirect) 
Cqp - specific costs caused (triggered) by 
 the quit (problems/inconveniences)   
Ce - costs by establishing new  
relationships that has to be compared with, 
Be - expected benefits by the new exchange 
relationships 
 
O is the additional intersecting factors such 
as institutional and individual trust (social 
norms),  
 
tc is the time-compression diseconomies, 
and finally  
Ψ  is the high degree of perceived 
uncertainty among the agents and in the 
environment, caused by: 
1) Volatility (dynamics/turbulence) in the 
external environment, and volatility in 
the task performance processes,  
2) Uncertainties involved in the adaptive 
adjustments of the interaction-
processes of the exchange relationship 
 
DEVELOPING A MATHEMATICAL MODEL: 
A HYBRID APPROACH 
 
Due to the complex nature, this paper proposes a 
hybrid approach for the model building, utilizing 
three types of mathematics (figure 3):  namely game 
theory, fuzzy logic, and discrete mathematics:     
 
Game Theory 
 
Game theory is perfectly suited for modeling 
interaction between agents that are interacting over 
some issues or resources [Li et al, 2001; Fraser and 
Hipel, 1984]. In a non-cooperative situation (‘game’ 
in game theory), the possible courses of action 
available to the agents (‘players’) are referred to as 
options. Any set of options that can be taken by a 
particular agent is called a strategy. When each agent 
Modeling  
PR 
Figure 3: Hybrid approach for developing a  
mathematical model 
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has selected a strategy, the result is referred to as an 
outcome.  
 
An extension of game theory that is useful for 
modeling personal relationship is the theory of moves 
(TOM). The theory of moves was proposed to 
introduce a dynamic dimension to classical game 
theory [Li et al, 2001; Brams, 1994]. TOM extends 
strategic thinking into the more distant future by 
allowing the agents to think ahead not just to the 
immediate consequences of making moves (e.g. 
immediate business or personal outcome) but also to 
the long-term consequences [Li et al, 2001]. 
 
Fuzzy Logic 
 
Though game theory and TOM are useful for our 
modeling purpose, the huge number of parameters 
need to be processed makes the modeling difficult, if 
not impossible. Thus, fuzzy logic can be used to 
obtain a level of abstraction to filter out the most 
important parameters from the less important ones, 
and to be able to work with less imprecise parameter 
values. There are many works that combines fuzzy 
logic with game theory [Kickert, 1978; Butnariu, 
1978], particularly, the theory of fuzzy moves (TFM) 
- integrating fuzzy logic with the TOM. 
 
Discrete Time Model 
 
Personal relationships take time to develop; it is a 
continuous process. However, a discrete time model 
is more appropriate for modeling of personal 
relationship and its impact on business relationships; 
this is because, as with econometric models, the 
interactions between the agents are not monitored 
continuously but at certain intervals of time, in other 
words, in discrete-time. Discrete time games have 
been used in other fields too, e.g. in biotechnology 
[Radcliffe and L. Rass].  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper proposes development of a mathematical 
model for understanding how the interaction between 
two agents leads to aggregate outcomes when 
personal relationship plays a major role in the 
business exchanges. In particular, the paper proposes 
research that deals with: 
 
1. Modeling and computation: to contribute a new 
methodology and technique for modeling the 
economics involved in a dyadic business 
environment where personal relationship is 
involved in business relationships;  
2. Simulations and experiments: building a 
mathematical model to reach a better 
understanding of the impact of personal 
relationship on switching a business exchange 
relationship and the costs involved (switching 
costs); 
 
Once a mathematical model is developed, case 
studies can be done on dyadic business exchanges, 
especially in tourism trade where dyadic business 
exchanges are more common; the case studies can 
contribute to the discovery of new laws that govern 
complex economic and social systems. Mathematical 
model can also help the design and development of a 
new tool that can ease making decisions on switching 
a business exchange relationship.  
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